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Non-technical summary: 
 
Motivated by substantial cross-sectional variation in banks’ leverage, which stands in 
contrast to the conventional wisdom that capital regulation is the main driver of 
banks’ capital structures, this paper examines the capital structure of banks from the 
perspective of the empirical capital structure literature for non-financial firms. 
Moreover, banks are generally excluded from studies of capital structure and therefore 
constitute a natural hold-out sample that may be of particular interest given its 
relatively homogenous composition and particular institutional context. Our sample 
includes banks from 16 different countries (US and 15 EU members) from 1991 to 
2004. We focus on the 200 largest listed banks (100 from the US and 100 from the 
EU – sampled anew each year based on their size) and have taken great care to reduce 
the survivorship bias in the Bankscope database. 
The paper finds that the standard cross-sectional determinants of firms’ capital 
structures also apply to large, publicly traded banks in the US and Europe. The sign 
and significance are identical and the economic magnitude of the effect of most 
variables on bank leverage tends to be larger compared to the results found in the 
literature for non-financial firms. We are unable to detect a first order effect of capital 
regulation on the capital structure of banks in our sample. This true for both book and 
market leverage, when controlling for risk and macro factors, when considering the 
effect of capital buffers, for US and EU banks examined separately, as well as when 
examining a series of cross-sectional regressions over time. Our results are unchanged 
when using regulatory Tier 1 capital ratios instead of book leverage as the dependent 
variable. The strength of the standard corporate finance determinants of leverage, 
however, weakens for those banks that are close to the minimum capital requirement. 
Further, we document that beyond the standard corporate finance variables, 
unobserved time-invariant bank fixed-effects are important in explaining the variation 
of banks’ capital structures. Banks with high (low) levels of leverage at the beginning 
of our sample also tend to have high (low) levels of leverage at the end. Hence, we 
confirm the recent evidence on the determinants of capital structure for non-financial 
firms in a sample of banks that operate in a different legal and institutional 
environment. Like non-financial firms, financial firms appear to have stable capital 
structures at levels that are specific to each individual bank. Such stability at the bank 
level stands in contrast to the uniform requirements imposed on banks by regulators 
based on Basel I and its subsequent modifications.  
Furthermore, our paper is complementary to the market discipline view of banking 
regulation that examines why the level of capital of banks in the US and around the 
world is much higher than regulation would suggest. The paper is also related to 
recent theories of optimal bank capital structure, in which capital requirements are not 
necessarily binding. 
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Dieses Papier untersucht ob die Faktoren, die die Kapitalstruktur von Industrieunternehmen 
bestimmen, auch einen Einfluss auf die Kapitalstruktur von Banken haben. Die 
Kapitalstruktur von Banken variiert stark in der cross section, was der allgemeinen Ansicht 
widerspricht, dass die Kapitalstruktur von Banken allein von Regulierung bestimmt ist. 
Banken werden fast immer von Stichproben ausgeschlossen, die sich mit Kapitalstruktur 
beschäftigen und stellen deshalb eine natürliche „hold-out“ Stichprobe dar, die sich zudem 
noch durch eine große Homogenität und ungewöhnliche institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen 
auszeichnet. Die Stichprobe in diesem Papier besteht aus den 200 größten, am Aktienmarkt 
gehandelten, Banken in der EU und den USA. Die Daten erstrecken sich von 1991 bis 2004 
und die Stichprobe wurde mit großer Sorgfalt für survivorship bias korrigiert. 
 
Das Papier zeigt, dass die gleichen Faktoren, die die Kapitalstruktur von 
Industrieunternehmen bestimmen, auch die Kapitalstruktur von großen, an der Börse 
gehandelten Banken in der EU und den USA erklären können. Das Zeichen und die 
ökonometrische Signifikanz der Koeffizienten der meisten Variablen sind identisch und 
ökonomisch sind die Effekte eher stärker als für Industrieunternehmen. Wir sind nicht in der 
Lage einen Einfluss der Regulierung auf die Kapitalstruktur von Banken empirisch 
festzustellen. Diese Schlussfolgerung ergibt sich aus Regressionen mit Markt- und Bilanz- 
Verschuldung, wenn wir für Risiko und Makrofaktoren kontrollieren und auch wenn wir den 
Effekt von Kapitalreserven in Betracht ziehen. Sie gilt auch denn, wenn wir die Regressionen 
separat für Banken in den USA und Europa schätzen, und ist stabil im Zeitablauf. Wir 
erhalten weiterhin konsistente Ergebnisse, wenn wir die Tier1 Kapitalrelation als abhängige 
Variable verwenden. Nur für Banken, die sehr nahe an dem regulatorischen Minimum sind, 
schwächt sich der Effekt der Variablen ab. 
 
Weiterhin dokumentieren wir, dass neben den üblichen Finanzstrukturvariablen, 
unbeobachtbare fixed effects, die sich im Zeitablauf nicht ändern, sehr wichtig sind in der 
Bestimmung der Kapitalstruktur von Banken. Banken mit viel (wenig) Eigenkapital am 
Anfang der Stichprobe haben auch viel (wenig) Eigenkapital am Ende der Stichprobe. Das 
bestätigt ein ähnliches Ergebnis für Industrieunternehmen in einer Stichprobe mit völlig 
anderen rechtlichen und institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen. Diese Stabilität in der 
Kapitalstruktur im Zeitablauf und die Stabilität der Unterschiede in der cross-section 
kontrastiert stark mit den gleichförmigen Kapitalregelungen unter Basel I. 
 
Die Ergebnisse dieses Papier sind konsistent mit dem market discipline Ansatz zur 
Bankenregulierung, die sich mit der Frage auseinandergesetzt hat, warum Bankenkapital in 
den USA und anderen Ländern so viel höher ist, als es Regulierung vorschreibt. Das Papier 
hat außerdem einen Bezug zu neueren Papieren, die theoretisch zeigen, warum Banken 
optimale Kapitalstrukturen haben, in denen Kapitalvorschriften nicht bindend sind. 
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The determinants of capital structure: Some evidence from banks 
Abstract 
This paper documents that standard cross-sectional determinants of firm leverage also apply 
to the capital structure of large banks in the United States and Europe. We find a remarkable 
consistency in sign, significance and economic magnitude. Like non-financial firms, banks 
appear to have stable capital structures at levels that are specific to each individual bank. The 
results suggest that capital requirements may only be of second-order importance for banks’ 
capital structures and confirm the robustness of current corporate finance findings in a hold-
out sample of banks.  
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Introduction 
Subsequent to the departures from Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s irrelevance proposition, 
there is a long tradition in corporate finance to investigate the capital structure decisions of 
firms. But what determines banks’ capital structures? The standard textbook answer is that 
there is no need to investigate banks’ financing decisions since capital regulation constitutes 
the overriding departure from the Modigliani and Miller propositions: 
“Banks also hold capital because they are required to do so by regulatory authorities. 
Because of the high costs of holding capital […], bank managers often want to hold less 
bank capital than is required by the regulatory authorities. In this case, the amount of 
bank capital is determined by the bank capital requirements (Mishkin, 2000, p.227).” 
Taken literally, this suggests that banks’ leverage ratio is a constant. In the cross-section we 
should observe little variation of banks’ capital structures. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
the ratio of book equity to assets for a sample of the 200 largest publicly traded banks in the 
United States and 15 EU countries from 1991 to 2004 (we describe our data in more detail 
below). There is a large variation in banks' capital ratios.1 Figure 1 indicates that bank capital 
structure deserves further investigation. 
Figure 1 (Distribution of book capital ratios) 
The strategy in this paper is to look for guidance in the empirical corporate finance literature 
that has at length examined the capital structures of non-financial firms (for a survey of the 
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1 The ratio of book equity to book assets is an understatement of the regulatory Tier-1 capital ratio (see for 
example MorganStanley, 2003). Using the latter shifts the distribution to the right (see Appendix Figure A.1). 
Figure A.1 shows that regulatory capital is not uniformly close to the minimum of 4% specified in the Basel 
Capital Accord (Basel I). 
literature see Harris and Raviv, 1991, and Frank and Goyal, 2007). Specifically, this paper 
estimates banks’ leverage as a function of variables that exhibit a consistent and stable cross-
sectional relationship with the leverage of non-financial firms in the US and other G-7 
economies (see for example Titman and Wessels, 1988, Rajan and Zingales, 1995, and Frank 
and Goyal, 2005). Can we uncover the same patterns for banks that have been identified for 
firms? Can we detect evidence of binding capital regulation or do financial firms look much 
like non-financial firms, at least from this perspective? 
A further important motivation for this paper is that banks are generally excluded from the 
investigation of capital structure. However, large publicly listed banks are a homogenous 
group of firms operating internationally with a comparable production technology. Hence, 
they constitute a natural hold-out sample, in part precisely because they are regulated and are 
frequently viewed as “special”.2 The literature on firm leverage has converged on a number of  
standard variables that are reliably related to the capital structure of non-financial firms. We 
check the robustness of these factors outside the environment in which they were originally 
uncovered.  
Lemmon et al. (2007) show that while the relationship of the standard variables to capital 
structure may be stable, their power to explain the overall variation of firms’ capital structures 
is low. Instead, firms’ capital structures are driven by an unobserved time-invariant firm fixed 
effect. Is the capital structure of financial firms also driven by such fixed effects? If so then 
this would suggest that we should be looking for factors explaining capital structure that are 
not limited to firms but extend to the financial sector. 
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2 The approach taken in this paper is similar to the one by Barber and Lyon (1997), who confirm that the 
relationship between size, market-to-book ratios and stock returns uncovered by Fama and French (1992) 
extends to banks. An early investigation of banks’ capital structures using a corporate finance approach is 
Marcus (1983). He examines the decline in capital to asset ratios of US banks in the 1970s. 
This paper finds that the standard cross-sectional determinants of firms’ capital structures also 
apply to large, publicly traded banks in the US and Europe. The sign and significance are 
identical and the economic magnitude of the effect of most variables on bank leverage tends 
to be larger compared to the results found in Frank and Goyal (2005) for US firms and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) for firms in G-7 countries. We are unable to detect a first order effect of 
capital regulation on the capital structure of banks in our sample. This true for both book and 
market leverage, when controlling for risk and macro factors, when considering the effect of 
capital buffers, for US and EU banks examined separately, as well as when examining a series 
of cross-sectional regressions over time. Our results are unchanged when using regulatory 
Tier 1 capital ratios instead of book leverage as the dependent variable. The strength of the 
standard corporate finance determinants of leverage, however, weakens for those banks that 
are close to the minimum capital requirement. 
Further, we document that beyond the standard corporate finance variables, unobserved time-
invariant bank fixed-effects are important in explaining the variation of banks’ capital 
structures. Banks with high (low) levels of leverage at the beginning of our sample also tend 
to have high (low) levels of leverage at the end. Hence, we confirm the recent evidence on the 
determinants of capital structure for firms in Lemmon et al. (2007) for a different set of firms 
and in a different legal and institutional environment. Like non-financial firms, financial firms 
appear to have stable capital structures at levels that are specific to each individual bank. Such 
stability at the bank level stands in contrast to the uniform requirements imposed on banks by 
regulators based on Basel I and its subsequent modifications.  
We are not the first to call into question whether capital requirements constrain banks. Barth 
et al. (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2007) and Berger et al. (2007) show that the level of 
capital of banks in the US and around the world is much higher than regulation would 
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suggest.3 Flannery and Rangan (2007) argue that bank leverage ratios are the outcome of 
market discipline (see also Flannery and Sorescu, 1996, Morgan and Stiroh, 2001, and Gropp 
et al., 2006). Our paper supports the market discipline view from a complementary 
perspective. 
Our paper is related to Flannery (1994), Myers and Rajan (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2000) 
and Allen et al. (2006), who develop theories of optimal bank capital structure, in which 
capital requirements are not necessarily binding. In Flannery (1994) debt counters the risk-
shifting incentives of the management of financial firms. Myers and Rajan (1998) show that a 
financial firm will have an optimal interior level of leverage that depends on the liquidity of 
its assets. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that optimal bank capital structure is the result of 
a trade-off between liquidity creation, costs of bank distress, and the ability to force borrower 
repayment. Banks may also hold equity in order to commit to monitoring their loans in a 
competitive environment (Allen et al., 2007). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our sample and explains how we 
address the survivorship bias in the Bankscope database. Section 3 presents the background 
for the list of firms’ capital structure determinants. Section 4 shows descriptive evidence. 
Section 5 carries out the econometric analysis. Section 6 discusses and extends our results and 
examines their robustness. Section 7 concludes. 
II. Data 
Our data comes from three sources. We obtain information about banks’ consolidated balance 
sheets and income statements form the Bankscope database of the Bureau van Dijk, 
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3 In our sample, the average Tier 1 capital ratio is 9.8%, more than twice the regulatory minimum of 4%.   
information about banks’ stock prices and dividends from Thompson Financial’s Datastream 
database and information about country level economic data from the World Economic 
Outlook database of the IMF. Our sample starts in 1991 and ends in 2004. We focus only on 
the 100 largest publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in the United 
States (as in Flannery and Rangan, 2007) and the 100 largest publicly traded commercial 
banks and bank-holding companies in 15 countries of the European Union. Our sample 
consists of 2415 bank-year observations.4 Table 1 shows the number of unique banks and 
bank-years across countries in our sample. 
Table 1 (Unique banks and bank-years across countries) 
Special care has been taken to eliminate the survivorship bias inherent in the Bankscope 
database. Bureau van Dijk deletes historical information on banks that no longer exist in the 
latest release of this database. For example, the 2004 release of Bankscope does not contain 
information on banks that no longer exist in 2004 but did exist in previous years.5 We address 
the survivorship bias in Bankscope by reassembling the panel data set by hand from 
individual cross-sections using historical, archived releases of the database. Bureau Van Dijk 
provides monthly releases of the Bankscope database. We used the last release of every year 
from 1991 to 2004 to provide information about banks in that year only. For example, 
information about banks in 1999 in our sample comes from the December 1999 release of 
Bankscope. This procedure allows us to quantify the magnitude of the survivorship bias: 12% 
of the banks present in 1994 no longer appear in the 2004 release of the Bankscope dataset. 
                                                 
4 We select the 200 banks anew each year according to their book value of assets. There are less than 100 
publicly traded banks in the EU at the beginning of our time period. There are no data for the US in 1991 and 
1992. We also replaced the profits of Providian Financial in 2001 with those of 2002, as Providian faced lawsuits 
that year due to fraudulent mis-reporting of profits. 
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5 For example, Banque National de Paris (BNP) acquired Paribas in 2000 to form the current BNP Paribas bank. 
The 2004 release of Bankscope no longer contains information about Paribas prior to 2000. There is, however, 
information about BNP prior to 2000 since it was the acquirer. 
III. Standard determinants of leverage 
The different corporate finance theories produce a long list of factors that drive firms’ capital 
structures (see Harris and Raviv, 1991, and Frank and Goyal, 2007, for surveys). Beginning 
with Titman and Wessels (1988), then Rajan and Zingales (1995) and recently Frank and 
Goyal (2005), the empirical corporate finance literature has converged on the following set of 
variables that reliably predict leverage of non-financial firms in the cross-section. First, 
leverage is positively related to size. It is usually argued that larger firms are either safer, 
better known in the market, more exposed to agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
or enjoy market power vis-à-vis investors, all of which may explain why larger firms have 
more debt in their capital structures. Second, more profitable firms tend to have less leverage. 
This is consistent with the pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984, Myers, 1984) and 
dynamic versions of the trade-off theory (Hennessy and Whited, 2005), while static versions 
of the trade-off theory predict that more profitable firms should lever up to shield their profits 
from corporate income tax (Bradley et al., 1984). Third, leverage is negatively related to a 
firm’s market-to-book ratio. Firms with high market-to-book ratios have little free-cash flow 
as they appear to have numerous profitable investment opportunities available to them 
(Jensen, 1986). Such firms need less debt in their capital structure to prevent managers from 
investing the free cash-flow in negative NPV projects. Flannery (1994) has argued that this 
problem may be particularly severe for banks due to the illiquidity and opacity of their assets. 
High growth firms also have more to lose in the case of bankruptcy and may suffer more from 
a debt-overhang problem so that they should be relatively less leveraged (Myers, 1977; see 
also Barclay et al., 2006). Market timing can also explain the negative relationship between 
leverage and the market-to-book ratio as firms issue equity when managers perceive it to be 
overvalued (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Dittmar and Thakor (2007) argue that firms issue 
equity when their valuation is high as this indicates agreement between managers and 
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investors about investment opportunities. Fourth, firms with more collateral have higher 
leverage. When more assets can be used as collateral, less is lost in distress reducing the 
bankruptcy costs of debt. Moreover, collateral reduces the agency cost of debt since it makes 
the monitoring of the use of assets easier. Finally, Frank and Goyal (2005) also find that a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm pays dividends is negatively related to 
leverage. One reason could be that paying dividends exposes firms to the scrutiny of capital 
markets and reduces the agency cost of equity (Easterbrook, 1984).6 
All these arguments extend naturally to banks unless one follows the textbook view that 
banks’ capital structures are predominately determined by capital regulation (Berger et al., 
1995). The textbook view is that i) bank deposits are insured to protect depositors and ensure 
financial stability and ii) banks must be required to hold a minimum amount of capital in 
order to mitigate the moral-hazard of this insurance (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993). 
Therefore, the standard corporate finance determinants of the capital structure should have 
little or no explanatory power for banks. 
IV. Descriptive evidence 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables we use. In the appendix we describe in 
detail how we construct these variables.7  
Table 2 (Descriptive statistics) 
                                                 
6 A further reliable determinant of firms’ leverage is the average leverage of their industry (see for example 
MacKay and Phillips, 2005). 
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7 We follow Frank and Goyal (2005) in our definition of variables. All data have been winsorized at 0.05% on 
both the left and right tail as in Lemmon et al. (2007). 
Given the sample selection process, the banks in our sample are large. Mean total book assets 
are $65 billion and the median is $14 billion. Even though we selected only the largest banks, 
the sample exhibits considerable heterogeneity in the cross-section. The largest bank in the 
sample is almost 3000 times the size of the smallest. In light of the objective of this paper, it is 
useful to compare the descriptive statistics of leverage and its main determinants to a typical 
sample of listed non-financial firms used in the literature. Hence, we compare our data to 
those used in Frank and Goyal (2005, Table 3).8 For both banks and firms the median market-
to-book ratio is close to one. The assets of firms are typically three times as volatile as the 
assets of banks (12% versus 3.6%). The median profitability of banks is 5.1% of assets, which 
is a little less than a half of firms’ profitability (12% of assets). Banks hold much less 
collateral than non-financial firms: 27% versus 56% of book assets, respectively. Our 
definition of collateral for banks includes liquid securities that can be used as collateral with 
central banks (ECB, 2001). Nearly 95% of publicly traded banks pay dividends, while only 
43% of firms do so. 
Based on these simple descriptive statistics, banking appears to be a relatively safe and, 
correspondingly, low return industry. This matches the recent finding by Flannery et al. 
(2004) that banks may simply be “boring”. Their level of leverage is, however, substantially 
different from that of firms. Banks’ median book leverage is 92.6% and median market 
leverage is 87.3% while median book and market leverage of non-financial companies in 
Frank and Goyal (2005) is 24% and 23%, respectively. Banking is an industry with on 
average very high leverage.  
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8 See also Table 1 in Lemmon et al. (2007) for similar information. 
But is it the case that there are no non-financial firms with levels of leverage similar to the 
ones observed for banks? To answer this question, we replicate Table 4 in Welch (2006) here 
as Appendix Table A.1. The table contains the 30 most levered firms in the S&P 500 stock 
market index. As expected, banks figure prominently on this list. Of the 30 most leveraged 
S&P 500 companies in the US one third are financial firms. However, the S&P 500 contains 
93 financial firms, which implies that 83 do not make this list. Instead, the 20 remaining non-
financial firms in the top 30 come from essentially all sectors including consumer goods, IT, 
industrials and utilities. Most of them have investment grade credit ratings, i.e. they are not 
considered close to bankruptcy. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that while banks are 
more likely to be highly levered, there is also a substantial number of non-financial firms no 
less levered than banks. This further supports our approach to examine bank capital structures 
using determinants related to the capital structure of non-financial firms. 
Table 3 presents the correlations among the main variables. Larger banks tend to have lower 
profits and more leverage. A bank’s market-to-book ratio correlates positively with asset risk, 
profits and negatively with leverage. Banks with more asset risk, more profits and less 
collateral have less leverage.  
Table 3 (Correlations among main variables) 
The positive relationship between risk and the market-to-book ratio is surprising in light of 
the banking literature that examines the link between risk taking and charter values (see 
Keeley, 1990; and Hellmann et al., 2000). This literature usually argues that charter values 
reduce the moral-hazard arising from deposit insurance and safety nets because banks with 
high charter values have more to lose when they go out of business. These charter values are 
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usually measured using market-to-book ratios. Hence, there should be a negative relationship 
with risk. The positive relationship we find could simply reflect a standard risk-return trade-
off: higher market values, i.e. higher expected future returns, are associated with higher risks. 
V. Econometric analysis 
Our baseline specification is the following standard capital structure regression: 
icttcitititititit uccDivCollSizeLnProfMTBL ++++++++= −−−− 5141312110 )( ββββββ  (1) 
The explanatory variables are the market-to-book ratio (MTB), profitability (Prof), the natural 
logarithm of size (Size), collateral (Coll) (all lagged by one year) and a dummy for dividend 
payers (Div) for bank i in year t. The dependent variable is one minus the ratio of equity over 
assets in market values (see the appendix for the definition of variables). It therefore includes 
both debt and non-debt liabilities such as deposits (see Welch, 2006). The regression includes 
time and country fixed effects (ct and cc) to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
country level and across time that may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of 
errors (Petersen, 2007). 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (1). We also report the coefficient elasticities 
and confront them with the results of comparable regressions for non-financial firms in Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2005). 
Table 4 (Standard cross-sectional determinants of market leverage) 
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All coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level, except for collateral, 
which is marginally significant at the 10 percent level. All coefficients have the same sign as 
in the corporate finance literature. Banks’ leverage depends positively on size and collateral, 
and negatively on the market-to-book ratio, profits and dividends.  
We find that the elasticity of bank leverage to all explanatory variables except collateral and 
dividends is larger than the elasticities of firm leverage to the corresponding variables.9 A one 
percentage change of the market-to-book ratio decreases bank leverage by 0.683 percent. 
Frank and Goyal (2005) find an elasticity of market leverage to the market-to-book ratio of  
-0.170. The elasticity of leverage to profits is -0.018 for banks (and -0.008 for firms). A one 
percent increase in median profits, $7.3m, decreases median liabilities by $250m. This is an 
economically significant effect. We conclude that the standard corporate finance determinants 
of capital structure also speak to banks’ market leverage. The model fits the data very well: 
The R2 is 0.72. 
The similarity of the results for banks and firms may even be more surprising as we are 
comparing a cross-country data set of very large entities with a US dataset composed of much 
smaller entities. The book value of assets in the bank dataset is about $64 billion, while the 
book value of assets in Frank and Goyal’s (2005) firm dataset is less than $100 million. Our 
dataset spans 16 countries. On the other hand, large listed banks as those in our sample may 
be viewed as a relatively homogenous set of firms operating with a similar technology across 
many markets. This further highlights the usefulness of examining standard firm capital 
structure in a hold-out sample of banks.  
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9 We examined whether the difference in the elasticity of collateral is due to differences in measurement across 
banks and firms. However, we found the results robust to defining collateral including or excluding liquid assets. 
We attribute the relatively weak result for dividends to the fact that almost all of the banks in the sample (more 
than 94 percent) pay dividends, suggesting only limited variation in this explanatory variable.  
Leverage can be measured in both book and market values. Both definitions have been used 
in the literature and yield similar results.10 The difference between book and market values 
offers an interesting angle for banks since capital regulation is imposed on book but not on 
market capital. Hence, we estimate equation (1) with book leverage as the dependent variable 
and check whether in the case of banks, standard corporate finance determinants continue to 
drive both measures of leverage similarly.11 
Table 5 (Standard cross-sectional determinants of book leverage) 
Table 5 shows that the results for book leverage are stronger than those for market leverage. 
Regressing book leverage on the standard corporate finance determinants of capital structure 
produces estimated coefficients that are all significant at the 1% level and all have the same 
sign as in studies of non-financial firms. Moreover, elasticities for the market-to-book ratio 
and size are much larger than for firms. The elasticity of bank leverage to profits is almost 
identical to the elasticity of firm leverage to profits. As in the case of market leverage, 
collateral and dividends are less important determinants of bank book leverage than of firm 
book leverage. Similar to the corporate finance literature for firms we are unable to detect 
large differences between the results for book and for market leverage of banks. This does not 
support the hypothesis that regulatory concerns create a wedge between the determinants of 
banks’ book and market capital structures. 
Despite its prominent role in corporate finance theory, risk sometimes fails to show up as a 
reliable factor in the empirical literature on firms’ leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Frank 
and Goyal, 2005). Regulators, however, can be expected to care about minimising the 
                                                 
10 Exceptions are Barclay et al. (2006) who focus on book leverage and Welch (2004) who argues for market 
leverage. Most studies, however, use both. 
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11 We report results for regressions on Tier 1 regulatory capital ratios in section VI below. 
downside risk of banks. Hence, we examine whether risk is an important factor for banks and 
whether it drives out the standard corporate finance determinants of leverage. 
Table 6 (columns 2 and 4) reports the results of estimating 
icttcit
itititititit
uccRiskLn
DivCollSizeLnProfMTBL
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The equation includes asset volatility (Risk) as an explanatory variable. The dependent 
variable is either book or market leverage. 
Table 6 (Adding risk to the standard cross-sectional determinants of leverage) 
Banks with more volatile assets have significantly less leverage, both in book and market 
values. Adding risk also substantially improves the fit of the book leverage regression: the R2 
increases from 0.32 to 0.48. The increase is smaller for market leverage. One possible 
interpretation could be that this reflects regulatory intervention. We tend to find this 
interpretation unconvincing. Capital requirements under Basel I are generally risk insensitive, 
which indeed was the motivation for revising the accord (Basel II). It seems therefore unlikely 
that the strong relationship between risk and leverage is explained by regulatory intervention 
based on Basel I alone. Regulators may, however, discretionally ask banks to hold more 
capital when they are riskier. In the US for example, regulators have modified Basel I to 
increase its risk sensitivity and the results could reflect these modifications (FDICIA). But 
Jones and King (1995) show that mandatory actions under FIDICIA are applied only very 
infrequently. Flannery and Rangan (2007) conclude that regulatory pressures cannot explain 
the relationship between risk and book leverage. Moreover, the marginal impact of risk on 
market leverage is twice as large as on book leverage. Finally, as we show below, we find a 
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significant negative relationship between risk and both market and book leverage for both the 
US and Europe. If FDICIA were the primary reason for the risk sensitivity of leverage, we 
should find this effect mainly for banks’ book leverage in the US. The negative coefficient of 
risk on leverage is in line with standard corporate finance arguments. More risk increases the 
likelihood of going bankrupt. This in turn may raise the cost of debt. In Welch (2004) and 
Lemmon et al. (2007) risk significantly reduces leverage. Halov and Heider (2004) argue that 
high risk firms issue equity to avoid the adverse selection cost of risky debt. 
Risk does not drive out the other variables. An F-test on the joint insignificance of all non-risk 
coefficients is rejected. All coefficients from Tables 4 and 5 remain significant at the 1% 
level, except i) the coefficient of the market-to-book ratio on book leverage, which is no 
longer significant, and ii) the coefficient of collateral on market leverage, which becomes 
significant at the 5% level (from being marginally significant at the 10% level before). Risk 
lowers the coefficient on the market-to-book ratio by two thirds. The reason is that risk 
strongly commoves positively with the market-to-book ratio (see Table 3: the correlation 
coefficient is 0.85) and we are unable to fully disentangle the effect of risk versus the effect of 
the market-to-book ratio on book leverage. 
Finally, we examine the finding of Lemmon et al. (2007) that most of the variation of firms’ 
capital structures is driven by an unobserved time-invariant firm specific factor. To check 
whether this finding extends to our hold-out sample of banks, we alter equation (2) and 
include firm instead of country fixed effects. 
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The results in Table 7 show that most of the variation of banks’ capital structures is also 
driven by bank fixed effects. The fixed effect accounts for 92% of book leverage and for 76% 
of market leverage. 
 
Table 7 (Adding bank fixed effects) 
 
Banks’ capital structures tend to remain stable over long periods of time at bank specific 
levels even after controlling for the standard determinants of leverage identified in the 
literature. The estimates keep the same sign as in Table 6 (columns 2 and 4) (except for the 
effect of the market-to-book ratio on book leverage) but their magnitude and significance 
reduces since they are identified from the time-series variation within banks only.12 
 
The Basel 1 capital requirements and their implementation apply to all relevant banks in the 
same way and are of course irrelevant for non-financial firms. Yet, banks’ leverages are stable 
around levels specific to each individual bank and this stability is similar to the one 
documented for non-financial firms. 
 
Confirming the finding of Lemmon et al. (2006) in our hold-out sample narrows down the list 
of candidate explanations for the unobserved determinants of the stability of capital structure. 
It not only holds in the original sample of publicly traded non-financial US firms (and a 
subsample of US and UK firms prior to going public) across many industries but also for 
large publicly traded banks in Europe and the US. Such banks form a fairly homogenous and 
global industry that operates under different institutional and technological circumstances 
than non-financial firms. One possible explanation that has been suggested for the original 
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12 A recent literature examines the dynamic properties of firms’ leverage (see for example Hovakimian et al., 
2001; Fama and French, 2002; and Flannery and Rangan, 2006).  
result of Lemmon et al. (2006), and that could also be applied to banks, is the importance of 
top managers and corporate culture on firms’ financing decisions (see for example Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2007; and Chemmanur et al., 2007).  
  
VI. Discussion, extensions and robustness 
Even though the concern of this paper is not the level of bank leverage, but rather its variation 
in the cross-section, our results shed new light on one explanation for the high levels of bank 
discretionary capital, i.e. capital in excess of the regulatory threshold, in many countries 
(Barth et al., 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 2007; Berger et al., 2007): The idea that banks hold 
capital buffers above the regulatory minimum in order to avoid the costs associated with 
having to issue fresh equity at short notice (see, for example, Peura and Keppo, 2006). It 
follows that banks facing higher cost of issuing equity should be less levered (see Section III). 
When we re-examine our results in this light, the evidence in favour of buffers appears weak: 
Banks with higher market–to-book ratios, higher profits and dividend paying banks can be 
expected to face lower costs of issuing equity. However, these banks hold less debt and, 
hence, more discretionary capital. Larger banks are more levered, which may be seen as 
evidence in favour of buffers, if one thinks that larger banks are better known to the market. 
But it may also be seen as evidence against buffers, if one believes that larger banks are more 
complex and, hence, potentially face larger asymmetric information costs of issuing equity 
compared to smaller banks. The only evidence unambiguously in favour of buffers is that 
riskier banks hold less debt.  
Although standard corporate finance determinants of firm leverage explain banks’ capital 
structures in the whole sample, and capital regulation therefore does not appear to be of first-
   
18
order importance for all banks, they could be less relevant for those banks close to the 
regulatory minimum. We therefore examine the leverage of banks that have little 
discretionary regulatory capital. 
Equation (4) builds on equation (2) and interacts all explanatory variables with a dummy 
(Close) that is equal to one if a bank has less than 5% of regulatory Tier 1 capital in the 
previous year.13 The dependent variable is the book leverage ratio. 
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The first column of Table 8 shows that the marginal impact of size, collateral and dividends is 
not significantly different for banks close or far away from the regulatory minimum. 
However, the coefficients for the market-to-book ratio, profits and risk are significantly 
different. For these variables the interaction terms tend to have the opposite sign and are 
significant at least at the five percent level. For banks close to the regulatory minimum, profits 
and risk are not significantly different from zero. The market-to-book ratio is significantly 
positive for those banks while it has a negative (although insignificant) effect for banks with 
more discretionary capital.14 We therefore conclude that the standard corporate finance 
drivers of leverage weaken for banks close to the regulatory minimum.  
 
Table  8 (Extension and robustness) 
 
We checked the robustness of the results along four additional dimensions: One, we add 
macro-economic control variables. Second, we run the regressions separately for US and EU 
                                                 
13 The Tier 1 capital ratio is not available for all banks in the sample. 
   
19
14 Based on an F-test whether the sum of an explanatory variable and its interaction with the Close dummy 
equals zero. 
banks. Third, we estimate the model year by year, in order to check whether the coefficients 
change over time and fourth, we estimate the model using the Tier 1 capital ratio as the 
dependent variable instead of market or book leverage.  
First consider the model with macro variables, which is reported in columns 2 (book leverage) 
and 5 (market leverage) of Table 8. Frank and Goyal (2005) test whether the capital structure 
of publicly traded firms in the US reacts to macro-economic conditions. We therefore add 
GDP growth, stock market volatility and the term structure of interest rates to the 
determinants of capital structure. It is possible that, unlike for firms, these variables matter for 
banks given their particular role in the economy. Banks finance firms so that their business 
depends on firms’ investment opportunities. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the 
business cycle, measured by the growth rate of domestic GDP, affects banks’ capital 
structures more than firms’ capital structures. Similarly, a key function of banks is maturity 
transformation. Banks receive short-term deposits that they lend as long-term loans to firms. 
The spread between the 3 month and the 10 year interest rate on domestic government bonds 
captures a possible impact of such intermediation on banks’ leverage. The overall risk of the 
environment banks operate in, measured by the standard deviation of domestic stock market 
index returns, may also play a role. Finally, we want to check whether some of the bank 
specific variables simply pick up business cycle effects, rather than bank specific trade-offs.  
Controlling for macro-economic factors does not change the coefficients or the significance of 
the standard determinants of leverage. The stock market volatility is a significant macro-
economic determinant of both book and market leverage (at the 10% level). Similar to banks’ 
individual risk, a riskier environment is associated with less leverage. A larger term structure 
spread is associated with higher market but not book leverage and this effect is significant at 
the 1% level. GDP growth is not significant. Once individual banks’ asset risk is controlled 
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for, adding macroeconomic factors does not help much in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation of banks’ capital structures. 
 
The results for estimating the model separately for US and EU banks are reported in columns 
3 and 4 (book leverage) and 6 and 7 (market leverage) of Table 8. We present the results for 
the two economic areas separately in order to examine whether the results are driven by US 
bank or EU banks alone. We find that this is not the case. All coefficients have the same sign 
as in previous specifications and tend to be significant. Exceptions include size and collateral 
for market leverage of US banks and dividends in case of book leverage for US banks.15 We 
conclude that our results do indeed extend to banks on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
We next estimate the models year by year to examine Flannery and Rangan’s (2007) 
contention that capital requirements have become less binding over time. Controlling for the 
standard determinants of leverage in each cross-section, we are unable to detect a clear trend 
in the estimated coefficients over time. While the significance of the coefficients is reduced in 
any given year (which is to be expected given the smaller sample size for each year), the signs 
and economic magnitudes are stable through time. The results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
 
Finally, we examine whether the standard corporate finance variables not only explain book 
and market leverage, but also Tier 1 capital ratios. We define the Tier 1 capital ratio in line 
with Basel I as Tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets. Note that we would expect all 
coefficients to have the opposite sign of the leverage regressions. Column 8 of Table 8 
confirms that more profitable and smaller banks have more Tier 1 capital (the coefficients are 
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15 We examined the insignificance of size and collateral and found that estimating the model without the large 
US credit card issues (5 firms) results in positive and significant estimates for size on market leverage. 
significant at the 1 percent level). Perhaps surprisingly, banks with more collateral hold more 
Tier 1 capital (significant at the 1 percent level). And finally, as one would expect, riskier 
banks also hold more Tier 1 capital (significant at the 1 percent level). Tier 1 capital ratios are 
not significantly related to market–to-book ratios and dividend paying status. Overall, the 
results for Tier 1 capital ratios are similar to those for book leverage.  
VII. Conclusion 
Motivated by substantial cross-sectional variation in banks’ leverage, this paper examines the 
capital structure of banks from the perspective of the empirical capital structure literature for 
non-financial firms. Banks are generally excluded from studies of capital structure and 
therefore constitute a natural hold-out sample that may be of particular interest given its 
relatively homogenous composition and particular institutional context. Our sample includes 
banks from 16 different countries (US and 15 EU members) for 14 years. We focus on the 
largest listed banks and have taken great care to reduce survivorship bias. 
This paper documents that standard cross-sectional determinants of firm leverage also apply 
to the capital structure of large banks in the United States and Europe. This is true for both 
market and book leverage ratios, when we examine US and European banks separately, 
controlling for risk and macro variables. The relationships appear stable over time. Except for 
some banks close to the regulatory minimum, the results do not reveal a strong effect of 
capital regulation on banks’ capital structures. Most banks seem to be optimising their capital 
structure in much the same way as firms. The results offer complementary evidence to studies 
showing that capital levels of banks in the US and around the world are much higher than 
regulation would suggest.  
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Moreover, the variation of banks’ leverage appears to be driven by an unobserved time-
invariant bank fixed effect. Like non-financial firms, banks have stable capital structures at 
levels that are specific to each individual bank. Our paper extends current capital structure 
findings, namely the robustness of a limited number of variables in explaining capital 
structure of non-financial firms and the importance of time-invariant firm fixed effects, to 
banks and across national borders. As these results hold outside the environment they were 
initially tested in, we think this has important implications for future work in capital structure 
for both banks and firms. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of book capital ratios 
The figure shows the distribution of banks’ book capital ratio (book equity divided by book assets) for 
the 2415 bank-year observations in our sample (15 EU countries and the US) from 1991 to 2004. 
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Table 1: Unique banks and bank-years across countries 
 
Country Unique banks Bank-years
AT 8 44
BE 5 29
DE 12 123
DK 11 77
ES 13 133
FI 3 30
FR 29 168
GB 17 121
GR 8 53
IE 5 43
IT 30 223
LU 4 34
NL 4 35
PT 5 62
SE 4 40
US 169 1,200
Total 327 2,415
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
The sample is the 2415 bank-year observations in 15 EU countries and the US from 1991 to 2004. See 
the appendix for the definition of variables.  
 
Mean Median St.Dev. Max Min
Book assets (m$) 64,100 14,900 126,000 795,000 288
Market-to-book 1.065 1.039 0.105 1.809 0.942
Asset risk 0.036 0.028 0.034 0.245 0.002
Profits 0.051 0.049 0.019 0.145 0.011
Collateral 0.266 0.260 0.130 0.782 0.015
Dividend payer 0.944 1 0.231 1 0
Book leverage 0.926 0.927 0.029 0.983 0.806
Market leverage 0.873 0.888 0.083 0.988 0.412
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Table 4: Standard cross-sectional determinants of market leverage 
The first column shows the result of estimating equation (1). It includes time and country fixed-effects. The dependent 
variable is market leverage. See the Appendix for the definition of variables. The second column reproduces estimates 
from Table 8, column 7 of Frank and Goyal (2005) and the third column reproduces estimates from Table 9, panel B, 
first column of Rajan and Zingales (1995) for comparison. The R2 in the first column is the correlation between the 
fitted value of the dependent variable from the regression and its actual value in the data. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level 
respectively. 
 
Dependent variable Frank and Goyal (2005b) Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Market leverage Table 8, Column 7 (1990-2000) Table 9, Panel B (United States)
Market-to-book ratio -0.560*** -0.022*** -0.08***
se 0.034 0.000 0.01
elasticity -0.683 -0.170
Profits -0.298*** -0.104*** -0.60***
se 0.097 0.003 0.07
elasticity -0.018 -0.008
Log(Size) 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.03***
se 0.001 0.000 0.00
elasticity 0.115 0.082
Collateral 0.020* 0.175*** 0.33***
se 0.012 0.004 0.03
elasticity 0.006 0.314
Dividends -0.019*** -0.092***
se 0.004 0.002
elasticity -0.020 -0.106
constant 1.360***
se 0.039
Number of observations 2415 63144 2207
R2 0.72 0.29 0.19
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Table 5: Standard cross-sectional determinants of book leverage 
The first column shows the result of estimating equation (1). It includes time and country fixed-effects. The dependent 
variable is book leverage. See the Appendix for the definition of variables. The second column reproduces estimates 
from Table 9, column 7 from Frank and Goyal (2005) and the third column reproduces estimates from Table 9, panel 
A, first column from Rajan and Zingales (1995) for comparison. The R2 in the first column is the correlation between 
the fitted value of the dependent variable from the regression and its actual value in the data. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% 
level respectively. 
Dependent variable Frank and Goyal (2005b) Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Book leverage Table 9, Column 7 (1990-2000) Table 9, Panel A (United States)
Market-to-book ratio -0.066*** -0.002*** -0.17***
se 0.016 0.001 0.01
elasticity -0.076 -0.012
Profits -0.210*** -0.214*** -0.41***
se 0.063 0.004 0.10
elasticity -0.012 -0.013
Log(Size) 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.06***
se 0.001 0.001 0.01
elasticity 0.107 0.050
Collateral 0.032*** 0.157*** 0.50***
se 0.009 0.005 0.04
elasticity 0.009 0.270
Dividends -0.009*** -0.078***
se 0.003 0.003
elasticity -0.009 -0.086
constant 0.886*** 0.038***
se 0.022 0.005
Number of observations 2415 64057 2079
R2 0.32 0.16 0.21
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Table 6: Adding risk to the standard cross-sectional determinants of leverage 
The first and third columns reproduce the first column of Table 4 and 5 respectively. The second and fourth column show the 
result of estimating equation (2) where the dependent variable is book and market leverage respectively. All regressions 
include time and country fixed-effects. See the Appendix for the definition of variables. R2 is the correlation between the 
fitted value of the dependent variable from the regression and its actual value in the data. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level respectively. 
 
Dependent variable
from Table 4 from Table 5
Market-to-book ratio -0.560*** -0.472*** -0.066*** -0.020
se 0.034 0.036 0.016 0.015
elasticity -0.683 -0.576 -0.076 -0.023
Profits -0.298*** -0.262*** -0.210*** -0.192***
se 0.097 0.087 0.063 0.058
elasticity -0.018 -0.015 -0.012 -0.011
Log(Size) 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
se 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
elasticity 0.115 0.105 0.107 0.102
Collateral 0.020* 0.020** 0.032*** 0.032***
se 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.008
elasticity 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009
Dividends -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.009*** -0.009***
se 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
elasticity -0.020 -0.021 -0.009 -0.009
Log(Risk) -0.024*** -0.013***
se 0.004 0.002
elasticity -0.028 -0.014
constant 1.360*** 1.195*** 0.886*** 0.799***
se 0.039 0.047 0.022 0.022
Number of observations 2415 2415 2415 2415
R2 0.72 0.78 0.32 0.48
Book leverageMarket leverage
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Table 7: Adding bank fixed effects 
The Table shows the result of estimation equation (3). It includes time and bank fixed-effects. In the first column the 
dependent variable is book leverage, in the second column it is market leverage. See the Appendix for the definition of 
variables. The R2 is the correlation between the fitted value of the dependent variable from the regression and its actual 
value in the data. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level respectively. 
Dependent variable Book leverage Market leverage
Market-to-book ratio 0.017*** -0.118***
se 0.006 0.039
Profits -0.244*** -0.392***
se 0.042 0.079
Log(Size) 0.003 0.013**
se 0.002 0.006
Collateral 0.001 0.006
se 0.007 0.013
Dividends 0.000 -0.010
se 0.002 0.007
Log(Risk) -0.005*** -0.016***
se 0.001 0.003
constant 0.845*** 0.717***
se 0.035 0.146
Number of observations 2415 2415
Frac. of variance due to bank FE 0.92 0.76
R2 0.26 0.57
 
 
. 
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Appendix  
Definition of variables 
 
 
Book leverage = 1- (book value of equity / book value of assets) 
Market leverage = 1- (market value of equity (=number of shares * end of year stock price) / 
market value of bank (=market value of equity + book value of liabilities)) 
Size = book value of assets 
Profits = (pre-tax profit + interest expenses) / book value of assets 
Market-to-book ratio = market value of assets / Book value of assets 
Collateral = (total securities + treasury bills + other bills + bonds + CDs + cash and due from 
banks + land and buildings + other tangible assets) / book value of assets 
Dividend dummy = one if the bank pays a dividend in a given year 
Asset risk = annualised standard deviation of daily stock price returns * (market value of equity 
/ market value of bank).  
GDP growth = annual percentage change of gross domestic product 
Stock market risk = annualised standard deviation of daily national stock market index return 
Term structure spread = 10 year interest rate – 3 month interest rate on government bonds 
Regulatory Tier 1 capital = Tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets 
Close = one if the bank has a Tier 1 capital ratio of less than 5% in the previous year 
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Figure A.1: Distribution of banks’ regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio 
The figure shows the distribution of banks’ book capital ratio (book equity divided by book assets) for 
the 2007 bank-year observations in our sample for which information about Tier 1 capital is available.  
 
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Tier 1 capital ratio
\
   
38
   
39
 
Table A.1: Capital Structure: Highly Levered S&P500 Companies in February 2006 
The table is a condensed version of Table 4 in Welch (2006). Empty cells denote data not available or 
not comparable. F=Financials, C=consumer goods, H= healthcare, I= industrial, IT= information 
technology, S= services. Ranking based on the debt/equity ratio. Ratings are from S&P. 
 
Ticker Name Industry Market 
leverage 
Book 
leverage 
Debt/equity 
ratio 
Rating 
FNM Fannie Mae F   3597%  
TXU TXU U  98% 2820% BBB- 
SLM SLM F 81% 96% 2425% A 
FRE Freddie Mac F   2240% AA- 
GT Goodyear C 83% 100%  B+ 
LU Lucent IT 57% 98% 1836% B 
MS Morgan Stanley F 93% 97% 1792% A+ 
GM General Motors C 98% 97% 1708% B 
BSC Bear Sterns F  96% 1430% A 
LEH Lehman Bros F 91% 96% 1296% A+ 
UST UST C  95% 1280% A 
AES AES U 73% 94% 1263% B+ 
F Ford C 95% 95% 1191% BB- 
GS Goldman Sachs F 91% 96% 1170% A+ 
CFC Country Fin’l F  93% 860% A 
CNP Centerpoint U  92% 700% BBB 
CIT CIT Group F 84% 89% 687% A 
AMZN Amazon IT 15% 93% 616% BB- 
NAC Navistar C 78% 94% 565% BB- 
EP El Paso I  89% 520% B+ 
ET E Trade F   510% B+ 
AXP American Express F 62% 91% 440% A+ 
CZN Citizens Comm IT 58% 84% 406% BB+ 
PBI Pitney C  88% 360% A+ 
THC Tenet H  90% 350% B 
AZO Autozone S  91% 340% BBB+ 
GE General Electric Mixed 96% 84% 339% AAA 
CAT Caterpillar I 50% 82% 305% A 
CMS CMS Energy U 81% 85% 299% BB 
DJ Dow Jones S 36% 91% 291% BBB+ 
  
